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TITLE IX SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER EDUCATION: CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
OF THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD SET FORTH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION'S 2011 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER

Lance Toron Houston*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the constitutional due process impact of the
vastly opposite and conflicting standards of review in Title IX sexual
assault investigations. Thousands of unionized public employees are
subject to the terms and conditions of a public university collective
bargaining agreement, which requires a heightened standard of "clear
and convincing evidence" to discipline employees. At the same timeperhaps unknowingly-the employee is also held to the strict federally
mandated standard of a "preponderance of the evidence," which has a
lower standard of review. In short, under the same facts and within the
same Title IX investigation, the employee is subject to two conflicting
legal standards. The circumstances and facts revealed that many Title
IX sexual assault investigations can lead to: employee discipline,
suspension, termination or even a private right of action. With this
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meaningful feedback, strong organizational skills, patience, and sense of humor have been very
much appreciated. A special word of thanks must also go to my family whose patience,
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pursue this particular field of study in employment law. A special thanks to my colleagues within
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challenged me to become a better scholar, person and friend. Finally, a note of gratitude to the
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valuable right at stake for unionized public university employees, the
legal conflict surrounding standards of review has manifested as one of
the nation's most pressing social, political, and legal matters of this
decade.
By examining this constitutionally important case, I define and
articulate the historical and legal origins of (1) collective bargaining
rights in the public sector; (2) the origins of Title IX from its initial
legislative embodiment to its present day form; and (3) the intersection
of unionization and due process rights in Title IX sexual assault
investigations which result in an unintended constitutional conflict that
may challenge at the core the legal permissibility of the manner in which
sexual assault investigations are conducted nationwide. At the outset, I
use two major research strategies: (1) a qualitative analysis and
nationwide data sample of numerous public sector university collective
bargaining agreements; and (2) established legal precedent. Data has
been collected from interviews, newspapers, legal precedent, case law
and published reports.
Undoubtedly, this Article challenges the constitutionality of the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. While public institutions and
public employee unions grapple with this important issue at the
grassroots level, the facts uncovered in this critical research reveals that,
upon legal challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court, the now ubiquitous
"preponderance of the standard," ostensibly mandated by the U.S.
Department of Education's 2011 Dear Colleague Letter is, in fact,
contrary to federal law and violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
This contention is not made lightly however. For what is at stake
for public education institutions, Congress, the courts, labor unions and
the like is of utmost legal importance. Yet, in view of the legal
precedent revealed in this research, there can be only one reasonable
conclusion when the evidence is considered in its totality; the April 2011
Dear Colleague Letter is not binding law. Rather, it is merely suggestive
agency guidance cleverly held out to the public as binding law but, in
actuality, lacks the necessary constitutional authority sufficient to
withstand legal challenge.
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a looming and unprecedented constitutional law issue on
the horizon for thousands of public colleges and universities nationwide.
This issue represents the evolution and eventual collision of years of
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legal jurisprudence involving collective bargaining rights from the origin
of public employee law and the administratively relaxed evidentiary
standards at play in Title IX sexual assault investigations in public
higher education. In a nutshell, when collectively bargained labor
agreements on American public college campuses calls for the
heightened "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in a sexual
assault investigation of a unionized employee, but federally mandated
Title IX investigations as required by the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter'
only require the much lower threshold "preponderance of the evidence"
standard to discipline the accused public employee, which prevails?
This question is paramount to the understanding of this issue and to
the analysis of the multitude of laws at play in this matter. The law of
collective bargaining, property rights, due process, and labor law which
applies the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, for example, is
plentiful.2 Equally so, the law relating to the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard is equally plentiful as its use is ubiquitous and
However, in
commonplace in American civil jurisprudence. 3
jurisdictions
in
all
silent
almost
is
juxtaposition to one another, the law
on which of the two prevails in the context of a federally mandated Title
IX investigation (the preponderance of the evidence standard) of a
unionized public employee (clear and convincing standard). Ultimately,
the overarching and final constitutional question remains: Does the Title
IX "preponderance of the evidence" standard mandated by the U.S.
Department of Education violate the constitutional due process rights of
the accused public college employee? Is the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard constitutionally permissible?
These are the core legal questions at the forefront of this research.
The answer to these important questions has yet to be determined by the
courts, but the issues are of grave legal and constitutional importance
nationwide to thousands of unionized public college employees, the
victims of sexual assault and, ultimately, to those investigating the
alleged sexual assault for the public higher education institution under
1. Russlynn Ali, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R. (Apr. 4, 2011),
Dear
[hereinafter
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
Colleague Letter].
2. See Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, JUSTIA, https://www justia.com/trials-

litigation/evidentiary-standards-burdens-proof/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2017) (stating that clear and
convincing evidence is a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence and requires the
plaintiff to prove that a fact is substantially more likely than not to be true).

3.

See id (stating that a preponderance of the evidence requires the jury to be able to find

that a fact or event is more likely than not to have occurred; meaning that the evidence favors the

plaintiffs outcome by at least 5fifty-one percent).
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the strict and multifaceted guidelines of the Title IX mandate.
A. Background
The problem of sexual violence, which includes rape and varying
forms of sexual assault, is a widespread problem incurred by college and
university campuses across the U.S. 4 It has been reported that "[a]s
many as one in every five women is likely to be raped or sexually
assaulted during her college years, most often by someone she knows." 5

And women attending college are more likely to be sexually assaulted
than those in the same age group that do not attend college.6
While the topic is one that is now very prevalent in the public
discourse, one of the earliest studies published which addressed the issue
was titled "Male Sex Aggression on a University Campus."7 In 1957,
for example, "sociologist Eugene Kanin posited a model where men
used secrecy and stigma to pressure and exploit women." 8 In the 1980s,
Mary Koss coined the term "date rape," a term that illustrates the
secrecy described by Eugene Kanin. 9 As a professor of psychology at
the University of Arizona, over the course of her career, Mary Koss has
collected the stories of thousands from campuses and around the world.1 0
A national study published in 1987, for example, revealed that "7.7
percent of male students volunteered anonymously that they had
engaged in or attempted forced sex."" Among those in that 7.7 percent,
almost none considered forced sex to be a crime. 12

4. Lavinia M. Weizel, The Process That is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence as the
Standard of Prooffor University Adjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Complaints,

53 B.C. L. REv. 1613, 1613-14 (2012).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Anya Kamenetz, The History of Campus Sexual Assault, NPR (Nov. 30, 2014, 8:03AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2014/11/ 3 0/ 3 66 3 4 8383/the-history-of-campus-sexual-assault.
8.

Id.

9. Id
10. Id
11. Id
12. Id.; see also Ellen Sweet, Date Rape Revisited, WOMEN'S MEDIA CTR. (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.womensmediacenter.com/feature/entry/date-rape-revisited. ("In 1982, MA. Magazine
and an academic researcher embarked on a groundbreaking study of a little-known subject: date
rape on college campuses. At that time, most people still thought of rape, on campus or off, as
committed by someone who was a stranger to the victim.

The three-year study, funded by the

federal government, surveyed more than 7,000 students at 35 schools and blew the top off accepted
wisdom. I [Ellen Sweet] was the coordinator of the MI. Magazine Campus Project on Sexual
Assault, and Mary P. Koss, ... a nationally known research psychologist, directed the field study
and analysis of data. The early findings first appeared in my article in the October 1985 issue of
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Simultaneously, "[a]s the women's civil rights movement gained
momentum in the late 1960's and early 1970's, sex bias and
discrimination in schools emerged as a major public policy concern." 1 3
Women, who were entering the workforce in record numbers, faced a
persistent earnings gap compared to their male counterparts.1 4 As a
result of the workforce inequality debate, "Americans also began to
focus attention generally on inequities that inhibited the progress of
women and girls in education." 5 In turn, "[s]everal advocacy groups
filed class action lawsuits against colleges, universities and the federal
government."1 6 In response to the inequities in education due to gender,
Congress took action to address this vital public policy concern with the
beginnings of legislation that eventually would become what is now
known today as Title IX.17
B. Origins of Title IX
In 1972, Indiana Senator Birch Bayh introduced an amendment on
the Senate floor that would later become Title IX.1 The amendment, as
he put it, had the purpose of combatting "the continuation of corrosive
and unjustified discrimination against women in the American
educational system."19 Officially, the sponsors of Title IX were Senator
Birch Bayh and Representative Edith Green. 20 Title IX, in its infancy,
was modeled after Title V1 2 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and they
both share a common purpose: to ensure that public funds derived from
all the people are not utilized in ways that encourage, subsidize, permit,
or result in prohibited discrimination against some of the people.22
Ms. entitled 'Date Rape: The Story of an Epidemic and Those Who Deny It.' Among them, 1 in 4
college women were victims of rape or attempted rape, and only 1 in 4 women whose sexual assault
met the legal definition identified their experience as rape.").
13. Title IX Legal Manual: Synopsis of Purpose of Title IX Legislative History, and
Regulations, JusTiA, https://www.justia.com/education/docs/titl6-ix-legal-manual/synopsis-ofpurpose-of-title-ix.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017) [hereinafter JUSTIA].
14.

See Anthony P. Carnevale and Nicole Smith, GenderDiscriminationIs at the Heart of the

Wage Gap, TIME (May 19, 2014), http://time.com/105292/gender-wage-gap.
15.

JUSTIA, supra note 13.

16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Title IX- The Nine, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/print/node/26393 (last visited Apr. 8,
2017).
21. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 22324 (2005).
22. See Overview of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
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Towards that end, both Title VI and Title IX broadly prohibit conduct by
a recipient of federal financial assistance that results in a person being
"excluded from participation in, ... denied 'the benefits of, or . .
subjected to discrimination under" a federally-assisted program or
activity. 23
Title VI was enacted pursuant to Congress' dual
constitutional authority under the spending clause 2 4 and § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.25
Thus, both Title VI and Title IX trace their roots to common
constitutional sources: 2 6
Congress and the U.S. Department of Education have
sought to address the problem of sexual assault in the
nation's schools through legislation such as Title TX of
the Education Amendments of 1972. Most commonly
known for promoting equality in sports participation,
Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in any
educational program or activity that receives federal
funds. Under Title IX, discrimination includes conduct
which denies or limits a student's ability to benefit from
a school's programs or activities on the basis of that
student's sex. Courts and the Department of Education
recognize sexual harassment as conduct that is so severe
or pervasive that it creates a hostile learning
environment, thereby limiting a student's ability to
access the full benefits of a school's program. Even a
single incident of sexual assault can create a hostile
environment and constitute sexual harassment.
Consequently, Title IX requires schools to respond
"prompt[ly] and effective[ly]" to student-on-student
sexual harassment and assault to mitigate the effects of
the hostile learning environment and to safeguard all
http://www justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevi.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2017) ("Title VI, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., was enacted as part of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. It prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving
federal financial assistance. As President John F. Kennedy said in 1963: Simple justice requires that
public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins] contribute, not be
spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or national
origin] discrimination.").
23. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 200d (1964).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. See id

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss2/5

6

Houston: Title IX Sexual Assault Investigations in Public Institutions of
TITLE IX SEXUAL ASSA ULT INVESTIGATIONS

2017]

327

students' right to an education free from sex-based
discrimination and violence.27
On June 23, 1972, Title IX of the Education Amendments was
enacted by Congress and was signed into law by President Richard
Nixon. 28 Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in any educational
program or activity receiving any type of federal financial aid.2 9
Members of Congress, in both the House and the Senate, continued to
introduce legislation addressing the problem of sex discrimination in
education.30
While it became commonly accepted that sex
discrimination in education was a problem that should be addressed,
varying opinions still existed as to the best means to bring it to an end.31
The purpose of this legislation was subsequently claimed by some
critics to be aimed at filling a quota or ratio of male to female students.32
Contrary to this, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana stated many times,
however, that "the amendment is not designed to require specific quotas.
The thrust of the amendment is to do away with every quota." 3 3 With
the introduction of Title IX in 1972 came enforcement of the law and the
establishment of specific institutional requirements to be met in order to
remain in compliance.34

27. Weizel, supra note 4, at 1615-16. Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, co-sponsor of the Title
IX bill explained that its purpose was to combat "the continuation of corrosive and unjustified
discrimination against women in the American educational system." 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972).
During debate, Senator Bayh stressed the fact that economic inequities suffered by women can often
be traced to educational inequities. In support of the amendment, Senator Bayh pointed to the link
between discrimination in education and subsequent employment opportunities. See id at 5804.

28. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000); see
also 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2017). Title IX provides that no person shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any education program or activity operated by a recipient. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (2017).
29. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000); see also
Dana
Bolger,
9
Things To
Know
About
Title IX,
KNow
YOUR
IX,
https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/title-ix/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
30.

Synopsis of Legislative History and Purpose of Title 1X, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,

https://www.justice.gov/crt/titleix#I.%C2%AOC2%AO%20Synopsis%20of%20Purpose%20Of/2
OTitle%201X,%2OLegislative%2OHistory,%20and%2ORegulations (last updated Aug. 6, 2015).
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34.

See The Living Law, TITLE IX, http://www.titleix.info/history/the-living-law.aspx

(last

visited Apr. 8, 2017).
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Title IXEnforcement andInstitutionalCompliance

The Title IX regulation is enforced by the U.S. Department of

Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") and is codified in the Code
of Federal Regulations. 3 5 Educational institutions that receive federal
financial assistance are covered by Title IX.3 6 "if only one of the
institution's programs or activities receives federal funding, all of the
programs within the institution must comply with Title IX
regulations."37 Failure to remain in compliance with Title IX may
subject an institution to a loss in federal funding.
Failure to remain in
compliance with Title IX may also subject the institution to civil actions
by victims of sexual assault. 3 9 There is an implied private right of action
to file suit against an institution for non-compliance with Title IX.40
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") governs formal
rulemaking by federal agencies like the Department of Education's
OCR.41 In its enforcement of Title IX, under the APA, the U.S.
Department of Education ("DOE") as a federal agency has the authority
to issue guidance documents and conduct formal rulemaking in order to
assist the public in understanding the myriad of federal regulations that
the DOE is mandated to enforce.4 2 Under the APA, "each [a]gency shall
separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the

35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2016); Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix-dis.html (last modified Apr. 29, 2015).
36. 34 C.F.R. § 106.11.
37.

Title

IX

Fact

Sheet,

WAYNE

CTY.

CMTY.

C.

DIST.,

http://www.wcccd.edu/dept/pdf/HR/00082907.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
38. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) ("The statute's only
express enforcement mechanism, §1682, is an administrative procedure resulting in the withdrawal
of federal funding from institutions that are not in compliance."); see also Tyler Kingkade, Colleges
Warned They Will Lose FederalFunding For Botching Campus Rape Cases, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/14/funding-campus-rape-dartmouth-

summit n 5585654.html (last updated July 14, 2014) (articulating the point that to date, no
institution has lost federal funding as a result of a Department of Education finding of a Title IX
violation).
39.

See Know Your Rights: Title IX and Sexual Assault, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/know-

your-rights/title-ix-and-sexual-assault (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
40.
Action,

Title IX Legal Manual: Private Right of Action and Individual Relief through Agency
JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/education/docs/title-ix-legal-manual/private-right-of-

action.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
42. Id § 552(a)(1); B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1293,
1316 (2015) (internal citations omitted) ("Executive agencies derive their authority from Article II
of the Constitution, which vests '[t]he executive power' in 'a President of the United States.'
Executive agencies are thus part of the political branches of Government and make decisions 'not
by fixed rules of law, but by the application of governmental discretion or policy.").
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guidance of the public . . substantive rules of general applicability
adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency."43

The APA states that a "rule" is defined as "the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.""
The APA "was adopted to provide, inter alia, that administrative
policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated
pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently
arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations." 45
In light of the DOE's status as a federal agency and its enumerated
obligations and rights to promulgate rules and changes to rules under the
APA,
[i]n April 2011, Vice President Joseph Biden and U.S.
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan announced that the
[OCR], the agency charged with enforcing Title IX, was
issuing a "Dear Colleague Letter" focusing on sexual
assault on college campuses and schools' Title IX
obligations to respond. The Department of Education
designated the Dear Colleague Letter [as] a "significant
guidance document," meaning that it sets forth
statements of general policy and interpretive rules of
broad, prospective applicability on regulatory and
statutory issues.

..

. One significant component of the

Dear Colleague Letter is its specification of the standard
of proof schools must use in campus disciplinary
proceedings for sexual assault complaints. Prior to the
Dear Colleague Letter, OCR had not specified that Title
IX requires schools to use a particular standard of proof
in disciplinary proceedings addressing student-onstudent sexual assault.
According to the Letter,
however, for a school's disciplinary procedures to
comply with Title IX, the school must utilize the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard in

43. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(1).
44. Id. § 551(4).
45. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974).
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adjudicationsfor sexual harassment and assault. Thus,
a school's use of a higher standard, such as "clear and
convincing evidence, " would constitute a violation of
Title IX. According to OCR, the preponderance of the
evidence standard is necessary to ensure an equitable
disciplinary proceeding because it is consistent with
other civil rights laws and is the evidentiary standard
used by OCR itself when investigating a school's
alleged failure to comply with Title IX. 4 6
The Obama Administration's new interpretation of Title IX,
utilizing the now articulated "preponderance of evidence" standard
within the April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter was a major policy shift
for the DOE.47 As stated, this new interpretation of Title IX by the DOE
sets forth requirements that all colleges and universities must meet in
order to remain in compliance, and created new standards and
substantive rules that bind all colleges and universities governed by Title
IX substantive rules "establish[es] a standard of conduct which has the
force of law.'-A
In other words, in adjudications involving substantive rules, the
facts will be analyzed as to whether they conform to the substantive

46. Weizel, supra note 4, at 1616-17 (emphasis added); see Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance
Practices,
72
Fed.
Reg.
3432,
3433
(Jan.
25,
2007),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR=2007-01-25/pdf/FR-2007-01-25.pdf ("Section 1(4) defines the
term 'significant guidance document' as a guidance document disseminated to regulated entities or
the general public that may reasonably be anticipated to: (i) Lead to an annual effect on the

economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local,
or tribal governments or communities; or (ii) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere

with an action taken or planned by another agency; or (iii) Materially alter the budgetary impact of
entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof;

or (iv) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or
the principles set forth in Executive Order 12866, as further amended. Under the Bulletin,
significant guidance documents include interpretive rules of general applicability and statements of
general policy that have the effects described in Section I(4)(i)-(iv).").
47. Josh Gerstein, Title IX The New Transparency Fight, POLITICO (May 25, 2014, 6:59
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/barack-obama-joe-biden-title-ix-transparency-fight107065; Allie Grasgreen, Tide Shifts on Title IX, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 24, 2012),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/04/24/ocr-dear-colleague-letter-prompts-big-changesexual-assault-hearings-unc;

On Campus, Debate Over Civil Rights and Rape, USA TODAY,

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-21/title-ix-campus-sexualviolence/54456812/1 (last updated Apr. 21, 2012, 3:00 PM). It remains unclear whether or not the
"preponderance of evidence" standard articulated under the Obama Administration will remain
intact under the Trump Administration.

48.

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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rules. For example, the Dear Colleague Letter uses phraseology such as
"must," which is the kind of "mandatory, definitive language [that] is a
powerful, even potentially dispositive, factor suggesting ... substantive
rules."49
II.

FORMAL RULEMAKING

Congress grants the authority and power to federal agencies to
conduct rulemaking.50 The Court determined, "absent constitutional
constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the 'administrative
agencies "should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to
pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties."'"' 5 However, to preserve legislative prerogatives
and to allow participation from affected parties the APA requires
agencies to provide the public with notice and the opportunity to
comment before promulgating final rules.52
After considering all relevant matter, "the agency shall incorporate
in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose."53 The requirement for notice and comment is "designed to
assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general
application." 54 Solicitation of public input for new regulations is more
than a bureaucratic courtesy; it ensures that the rulemaking process
remains in harmony with the basic tenets of representative government.
The APA exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
[and] rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from its
notice and comment requirement.56 This exemption recognizes that, in
theory, such rules do not impose new obligations but affect only the
*
agency itself or serve simply to clarify existing
agency* interpretations. 57
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has stated that
"if a statement has a present-day binding effect," it is a substantive rule
49.

Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("In the modem

administrative state, many 'laws' emanate not from Congress but from administrative agencies,
inasmuch as Congress has seen fit to vest broad rulemaking power in the executive branch,

including independent agencies.").
50. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
51.

519, 543
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.

(1978).
5 U.S.C. § 553.
Id. § 553(c).
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969).
Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
Id
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and thus must be subject to APA notice and comment.5 8
In determining whether a rule has binding effect and imposes new
legal obligations, courts review the language of the agency statement for
imperative language such as must and "will." 59 Courts also assess an
agency's intention to bind its own decision-making moving forward as
evidence of a substantive rule. 60 "[A] critical test of whether a rule is a
general statement of policy is its practical effect in a subsequent
administrative proceeding"; if an agency statement establishes a
"binding norm," it has engaged in substantive rulemaking.61 In stark
contrast, interpretative rules "merely clarify or explain existing law or
regulations."62 To determine whether an agency action is a substantive
rule, requiring notice and comment, or simply an interpretative rule, the
Supreme Court has looked to the impact of the rule on "individual rights
and obligations." 63
Similarly, the lower federal courts are in accord with the reasoning
of the Supreme Court insofar as individual rights and obligations are
implicated. 4 These courts have held that, with regard to substantive
versus interpretative rules, there are two means of determining whether
"an agency has issued a binding norm or merely a statement of policy." 65
One requires the court to ask whether the agency has "(1) 'impose[d]
any rights and obligations,' or (2) 'genuinely [left] the agency and its
decision makers free to exercise discretion."' 66 The other is to look to
the agency's intent, considering three factors: "(1) the agency's own
characterization of the action; (2) whether the action was published in
the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether
the action has binding effects on private parties or on the agency." 6 7
Notwithstanding, in light of the APA's authorization of guidance
documents by federal agencies, the observation of the APA's notice-andcomment requirements by those agencies remains a great concern.
58. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
59. Am. Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
60. Id.
61. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Say. & Loan Insurance Corp., 589 F.2d 658,
666 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
62. Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1983).
63. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979).
64. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
65. Wilderness Soc'y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
66. CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
67. Wilderness Soc'y, 434 F.3d at 595; Northwest Bypass Group v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 552 F. Supp. 2d 97, 120-21 (D.N.H. 2008).
68. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3433 (Jan. 25,
2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR=2007-01-25/pdf/FR-2007-01-25.pdf.
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When an agency adopts a binding policy position rather than creating a
rule that interprets an existing law, "regardless of how they initially are
labeled," those changes are seen by both Congress and the courts as
requiring notice-and-comment. 6 9 The APA's notice-and-comment
requirement is considered a safeguard against poor and arbitrary
governance in order to promote transparency and accountability.70
Similarly, legal scholars and commentators have pointed to the
APA's broad definition of the term "rule." 71 In reality, when an agency
makes a statement for the purpose of interpreting or prescribing a law or
announcing a policy, that statement is a "rule" under the APA. 72 In
short, when an agency adopts a substantive rule without following the
APA's notice and comment requirement, absent a good cause for not
doing so, it is a non-legislative rule.73 The rule itself is not invalid
procedurally. 74 Rather, it is when an agency gives that rule binding legal
effect that the action of the agency is unlawful.7 ' However, the nonlegislative rule still may be invalid if the rule interprets the law
improperly.
With regard to the "Dear Colleague Letter" and its "rule"
mandating a preponderance of the evidence standard, there was no
notice and comment phase established before the document was issued
by the DOE and announced by Vice President Biden as a "significant
guidance document." 7 7 Interestingly, and opposite to the statutory
requirements of the ADA, the DOE, in a nondescript footnote to the
Dear Colleague Letter announcement on its website, invited public
comments to the rule only after the mandate requiring a preponderance

69. Id.
7 0. Id.
71.

See, e.g., William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1321,

1322 (2001) ("Accordingly, a 'rule' under the APA includes both 'interpretative rules' and 'general
statements of policy;' terms which are themselves undefined, but which are used in section 553 of
the APA to describe certain rules that are exempt from the requirements of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.").

72.

Id. ("These rules are often called nonlegislative rules, because they are not 'law' in the

way that statutes and substantive rules that have gone through notice and comment are law, in the
sense of creating legal obligations on private parties. These rules can be contrasted with legislative
rules, which are 'law,' because legislative rules have binding legal effect. That is, just like statutes

passed by Congress, these rules adopted by an agency are legally binding on persons, and in many
cases violations of these rules can subject a person to civil or criminal penalties.").

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id.
Id.

77.

Dear ColleagueLetter, supranote 1, at 1, 10.
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of the evidence standard was made public.18 The post-announcement
invitation for public comment states:
OCR issues this and other policy guidance to provide
recipients with information to assist them in meeting
their obligations, and to provide members of the public
with information about their rights, under the civil rights
laws and implementing regulations that we enforce.
OCR's legal authority is based on those laws and
regulations. This letter does not add requirements to
applicable law, but provides information and examples
to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether
covered entities are complying with their legal
obligations. If you are interested in commenting on this
guidance, please send an e-mail with your comments to
OCR@ed.gov, or write to us at the following address:
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education,
400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20202.79
In apparent recognition of its well-established notice and comment
obligations, in 2014 the DOE followed the APA in order to implement
its changes to the Clery Act by the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA). 0 Under the Clery Act, all
institutions of higher learning that receive federal funding are required to
notify members of the campus community upon the occurrence of
certain crimes.8 When campus law enforcement or security learns of a
crime that poses a threat to students and employees, the college or
university must alert the campus community in a timely fashion.8 2
Clearly, the U.S. DOE, a federal agency, failed to follow the
APA. 8 3 The DOE instead invited public comment to its newly
announced agency interpretation after its April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague
publication. 84 This action, in direct opposition to the APA, relegates the
preponderance of the evidence standard mandated in the April 4, 2011

78. Id. at 1-2.
79. Id.
80. Violence Against Women Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 202 (Oct. 20, 2014) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. pt. 668), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-20/pdf/2014-24284.pdf
81. Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007).
82. Id.
83.
84.

See Funk, supra note 71, at 1322.
See Dear ColleagueLetter, supranote 1, at 1-2.
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Dear Colleague Letter and the procedure with which it was promulgated
as a non-legislative, non-notice and comment (interpretive) rule,
meaning without binding legal effect.85 This type of agency action in
violation of the APA's notice and comment requirements has been
recognized by the courts in all its various iterations and has been
consistently reversed.86
III.

JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURE ACT

OF

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

In recent years, the federal courts have consistently found that
federal agencies who re-interpret pre-existing regulations remain under a
strict duty to comply with the APA. 87 The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1992, for example, in regards to an announcement by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, held "that a 1988
regulation which had theretofore been construed to strictly prohibit
abortion counseling or referral ... in Title X programs, would thereafter
be interpreted to permit doctors to counsel on abortion . . . effectively
amend[ing] the 1988 regulation to significantly alter its meaning, as
previously interpreted," and therefore required notice and comment
In 2008, the U.S. District Court for the District of
procedure.88
Columbia held that a Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual section
2534.5, concerning calculation of amount of atypical services exception,
significantly altered Department of Health and Human Services'
established interpretation of 42 U.S.C. section 1395d(a)(2) and §
1395x(v)(1)(A), the Department violated the APA by not following
notice and comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(l)-(3) before
enacting section 2534.5.89

85. See id.; see also Funk, supra note 71, at 1322-23; Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance Practice, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432-33 (Jan. 25, 2007).
86. See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 3436 n. 23;
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (striking down PCB risk assessment
guidance as a legislative rule which required notice and comment); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
208 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (striking down emissions monitoring guidance as a
legislative rule which required notice and comment); Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Labor, 174
F.3d 206, 208, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (striking down an OSHA Directive as a legislative rule which
required notice and comment); see also e.g., Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v.

Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
87. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 3433.
88. Sullivan, 979 F.2d at 228-29, 242.
89. Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 578 F. Supp. 2d 129, 134 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Mercy
Med. Skilled Nursing Facility v. Thompson, No. C.A.99-2765TPJ, 2004 WL 3541332, at *3
(D.D.C. May 14, 2004) ("Any significant alternation of [an] established practice requires notice and
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Central to the APA compliance argument, on January 25, 2007, the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), Executive Office of the
President (one year before the Obama Administration took office and
four years before the April 2011 Dear Colleague Letter), issued a Final
Bulletin in the Federal Register entitled "'Agency Good Guidance
Practices' which establishes policies and procedures for the
development, issuance, and use of significant guidance documents by
Executive Branch departments and agencies." 90 The intent of the
bulletin was "to increase the quality and transparency of agency
guidance practices and the significant guidance documents produced
through them." 91 The authority of the Bulletin "is issued under statutory
authority, Executive Order, and OMB's general authorities to oversee
and coordinate the rulemaking process."9 2 Within this final bulletin
issued by OMB lies the constitutional blueprint and legislative
forewarning against unlawful and unfounded agency rulemaking action
under the guise and concealment of "guidance documents."93
The OMB Final Bulletin makes clear, in no uncertain terms that

an opportunity for those affected to comment")).
90. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 3432.
91. Id. at 3432.
92. Id. at 3433.
In what is commonly known as the Information Quality Act, Congress
directed OMB to issue guidelines to "provide policy and procedural guidance
to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, utility,
objectivity and integrity of information disseminated by Federal agencies.
Moreover, Executive Order 13422, "Further Amendment to Executive Order
12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review," recently clarified OMB's
authority to oversee agency guidance documents. As further amended,
Executive Order 12866 affirms that "[cloordinated review of agency
rulemaking is necessary to ensure that regulations and guidance documents
are consistent with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the
principles set forth in this Executive order," and the Order assigns that
responsibility to OMB.
Id.
93. See id. at 3436.
Section 11(2) establishes basic requirements for significant guidance
documents. They must: (i) Include the term "guidance" or its functional
equivalent; (ii) Identify the agenc(ies) or office(s) issuing the document; (iii)
Identify the activity to which and the persons to whom the document applies;
(iv) Include the date of issuance; (v) Note if it is a revision to a previously
issued guidance document and, if so, identify the guidance that it replaces;
(vi) Provide the title of the guidance and any document identification number,
if one exists; and (vii) include the citation to the statutory provision or
regulation (in Code of Federal Regulations format) which it applies to or
interprets.

Id.
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given their legally nonbinding nature, significant
guidance documents should not include mandatory
language such as "shall," "must," "required" or
"requirement," unless the agency is using these words to
describe a statutory or regulatory requirement, or the
language is addressed to agency staff and will not
foreclose consideration by the agency of positions
advanced by affected private parties.94
It has been held that "agencies need to follow statutory rulemaking
requirements, such as those of the APA, to issue documents with legally
binding effect, i.e., legislative rules." 95 In closing, the Final Bulletin
states that, with regard to an agency's duty to comply with APA
requirements:
The agency then should publish a notice in the Federal
Register announcing that the significant guidance
document is available. The agency must post the
significant guidance document on the Internet and make
it available in hard copy. The agency also must prepare
a robust response-to-comments document and make it
publicly available. 96
More persuasively, the Supreme Court on March 9, 2015,
articulated a more strict and exacting judicial interpretation of the APA's
notice and comment requirements on executive agencies and the
distinction between legislative rules and non-legislative rules. 97 In Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the Supreme Court stated that
The [APA] establishes the procedures federal
administrative agencies use for "rule making," defined
as the process of "formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule."..... The APA distinguishes between two types of
rules: So-called "legislative rules" are issued through
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and have the "force
and effect of law." "Interpretive rules," by contrast, are
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 3436 n.23.
Id. at 3438.
See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S._ 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
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"issued . .
to advise the public of the agency's
construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers," . . . do not require notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and "do not have the force and effect of
law." 98
Arguably, however, the distinction between legislative rules and
interpretative rules or policy statements has been described at various
times as "tenuous." 99 Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court held,
opposite to the widely held judicial approach, that "[b]ecause an agency
is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial
interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures to amend
or repeal that rule." 100
In this case, the Mortgage Bankers Association ("MBA") "filed suit
contending, as relevant here, that the [DOL] Administrator's
interpretation was procedurally invalid under the D.C. Circuit's decision
in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P."'0 o Under what
has come to be known as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, courts "hold[]
that an agency must use the APA's notice-and-comment procedures
98. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1200-01 (citations omitted). In cases similar to Perez, the federal
courts have made it clear that the APA must be followed when a Federal agency wishes to amend its
regulations.
When Congress authorizes an agency to create standards, it is delegating
legislative authority, rather than itself setting forth a standard which the
agency might then particularize through interpretation. Put differently, when
a statute does not impose a duty on the persons subject to it but instead
authorizes (or requires-it makes no difference) an agency to impose a duty,
the formulation of that duty becomes a legislative task entrusted to the
agency. Provided that a rule promulgated pursuant to such a delegation is
intended to bind, and not merely to be a tentative statement of the agency's
view, which would make it just a policy statement, and not a rule at all, the
rule would be the clearest possible example of a legislative rule, as to which
the notice and comment procedure not followed here is mandatory, as distinct
from an interpretive rule; for there would be nothing to interpret.
Mission Grp. Kan. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 1998).
99. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
No talismanic factor has emerged from the cases or the commentary as a
guide for puzzled courts, and the last section of a lengthy dissent is no place
to assay a definitive resolution of the riddle. Therefore, without attempting to
establish a general formula for detecting legislative rules although they are
labeled interpretative, I will simply identify three aspects of this proceeding
which support the conclusion that the Commission's new approach to
[s]ection 315(a)(4) is not merely an interpretation.
Id.; see also Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a
Proposalfor Public Participation,1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 348 (1986).
100. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1201.
101. Id at 1201 (citations omitted).
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when it wishes to issue a new interpretation of a regulation that deviates
significantly from a previously adopted interpretation."l 0 2 At the district
court level, the Department was granted summary judgment, "but the
D.C. Circuit applied Paralyzed Veterans and reversed."1 0 3 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed upon certiorari and held in sum that "[t]he
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is contrary to the clear text of the APA's
rulemaking provisions and improperly imposes on agencies an
obligation beyond the APA's maximum procedural requirements."' 04
In unusual and specific detail of the APA, the Supreme Court stated
the foundation and purpose of the APA and how its legal requirements
must be met when it articulated that:
The APA establishes the procedures federal
administrative agencies use for "rule making," defined
as the process of "formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule." "Rule," in turn, is defined broadly to include
"statement[s] of general or particular applicability and
future effect" that are designed to "implement, interpret,
or prescribe law or policy." Section 4 of the APA, 5
U.S.C. section 553, prescribes a three-step procedure for
so-called "notice-and-comment rulemaking." First, the
agency must issue a "[g]eneral notice of proposed
rulemaking," ordinarily by publication in the Federal
Register. Second, if "notice [is] required," the agency
must "give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments." An agency must
consider and respond to significant comments received
during the period for public comment.... Not all
"rules" must be issued through the notice-and-comment
process. Section 4(b)(A) of the APA provides that,
unless another statute states otherwise, the notice-andto
not apply"
"does
requirement
comment
or
policy,
of
"interpretative rules, general statements
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.
The term "interpretative rule," or "interpretive rule," is
not further defined by the APA, and its precise meaning

102. Id
103. Id.
104. Id.
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is the source of much scholarly and judicial debate.os
The Supreme Court concluded its detailed explanation of the APA,
interpretive rules and its non-binding nature by stating explicitly that
interpretive rules "do not have the force and effect of law and are not
accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process."a
Based upon the Supreme Court's holding in this matter, these facts
demonstrate that a federal agency that issues re-interpretative guidelines
must meet APA requirements, or the law is non-binding as an
interpretive rule.1 0 7 This Supreme Court ruling provides the legal
context for the DOE's failure to meet the APA guidelines.10 Yet, even
105.

Id. at 1203-04 (citations omitted).

106. Id. at 1204.
[T]he Supreme Court released another decision for the government in
[Perez], which concerned how to tell the difference between an
administrative interpretive rule and a substantive rule under the [APAJ.
Under the APA, an interpretive rule need not be subjected to notice-andcomment, but a substantive rule must. Agencies have several ways to use
interpretive rules as a substitute for substantive rules, so naturally, the
question becomes: how do we tell the difference? In 1997, D.C. Circuit
judge Laurence Silberman (who also taught Administrative Law at
Georgetown) wrote an important decision in a case called [Paralyzed
Veterans]. In it, Judge Silberman explained that "[t]o allow an agency to
make a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation
without notice and comment obviously would undermine" the APA's
requirements of notice and comment for all repeals or amendments of
substantive rules. To tell when an interpretive rule is actually substantive,
then, it depends on whether the interpretation "really provides all the
guidance," filling in the content of a "very general" rule. If so, then changing
such an "interpretive" rule without notice and comment would violate the
APA. Although the Court's judgment was 9-0 for the government, the
opinions split four ways. The majority opinion stuck to the narrow statutory
ruling described below. Justice Alito concurred with most of the Court's
opinion, but wrote separately to endorse Justices Scalia and Thomas's
critiques of deference to agencies. Justice Scalia agreed only with the
majority's reasoning that that the D.C. Circuit's approach was inconsistent
with the APA and wrote separately to criticize deference as a more general
matter. Justice Thomas, too, agreed with the Court's holding under the APA,
but wrote separately to outline a broader set of separation-of-powers
questions raised by agency deference.
Jonathan Keim, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association: Formalism Trumps Originalism, NAT'L
REV. (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/415306/perez-vmortgage-bankers-association-formalism-trumps-originalism-jonathan-keim.
107. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204; Keim, supra note 106.
108. See Keim, supra note 106; see also Hans Bader, No, OCR's April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter

is

not

Entitled

to

Deference,

LIBERTY

UNYIELDING

2

(Sept.

30,

2015),

http://libertyunyielding.com/2015/09/30/no-ocrs-april-4-201 1-dear-colleague-letter-not-entitleddeference/.
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without the Supreme Court's authoritative ruling in this matter, the
DOE's April 2011 Dear Colleague Letter evidentiary rule also fails as
authoritative agency guidance because of binding judicial precedent
under the Chevron deference. 109
IV.

THE CHEVRON DEFERENCE

Assuming arguendo, that the Supreme Court does not reverse the
DOE's apparent rule mandating the preponderance of the evidence
standard on APA violation grounds, the rule also stands in jeopardy of
1 10
In
reversal on grounds of the violation of the Chevron deference.
be
should
weight
much
how
addressed
Court
Supreme
U.S.
1984, the
given to federal agencies' interpretation of federal law and whether the
agency's interpretation of statutes was a permissible construction of a
statutory scheme."' In Chevron v. NRDC, the Supreme Court held that
EPA's interpretation of the statute was a permissible construction and
entitled to deference, where the legislative history of the statute was
silent as to the instant issue.112 In other words, the Supreme Court held
that a court must give effect to an agency's regulation containing a
1
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
This theory has come to be known as the "Chevron Deference."ll4
Here, petitioner sought review of a judgment from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which set aside a
regulation." 5 Petitioner contended that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) regulation, implementing permit requirements for
nonattainment states pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977,16 was a reasonable interpretation of the term "stationary
source."1 17 Petitioner argued that the EPA regulation, implementing
permit requirements for nonattainment states pursuant to the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. section 7502(c)(6), permitting
states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same
industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single 'bubble'
[was] based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Bader, supranote 108, at 3.
See id
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Id. at 866.
Id. at 843-44.
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(6) (2012).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
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'stationary source."'1
On appeal, the judgment below was reversed.1 19 In support of its
ruling, the Supreme Court held that "if the statute was silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
[was] whether the agency's action [was] based on a permissible
construction of the statute."l 2 0 Further, the Court "ha[s] long recognized
that considerable weight [was to] be accorded to an agency's
construction of a statutory scheme. . .. ,,121 The Court noted that while
the legislative history of the statute was silent on the instant issue, it did
reveal that the EPA's interpretation was fully consistent with one of the
two principal goals of the statute, namely allowance of reasonable
economic growth. 122 Accordingly, the EPA's interpretation was entitled
to deference. 123
Similar to the thrust of this dissertation, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment because the EPA's interpretation of the statute
was a permissible construction and entitled to deference, where the
legislative history of the statute was silent as to the instant issue.1 24
Here, regarding the DOE's 2011 Dear Colleague Letter which mandates
the preponderance of the evidence standard in Title IX sexual assault
investigations, there is no legislative history because the proposed rule
was not submitted for notice and comment in violation of the APA. 12 5
Similarly, it has been argued that:
A "Dear Colleague" letter, by its very nature, is not
entitled to binding force - that is, Chevron deference.
Depending on its contents and reasoning, such a letter
might be entitled to so-called Skidmore deference - a
lesser form of deference which means an agency's
decision is not binding, but merely worthy of
consideration, and thus to be followed only if it is
persuasive.

,,126

Prior to its March 2015 decision in Perez, the Supreme Court made
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 851.
See id. at 866.
Id

125.

See Bader, supra note 108.

126. Id. (citations omitted).
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clear its view of federal agencies and the controlling weight of guidance
documents that do not meet APA notice and comment requirements. 12 7
In Christensen v. Harris County, the Court held that, with respect to a
Department of Labor Opinion Letter:
[W]e confront an interpretation contained in an opinion
letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal
rulemaking.
adjudication or notice-and-comment
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.1 2 8
In applying the Supreme Court's holding on interpretative rules in
Perez,1 2 9 in light of the strict tenets of the Chevron deference, 130 the
January 2007 OMB Final Bulletin in the Federal Register,131 and the
enumerated procedural requirements of the APA,1 32 the DOE issued the
2011 Dear Colleague Letter in its newly articulated interpretation of
Title IX, which is a non-binding, non-legislative agency rule which has
no legal binding effect.' 3 3 The Dear Colleague Letter falsely directs
colleges to employ a lowered evidentiary standard ("preponderance of
the evidence") which violates the APA and, upon discipline or
termination of a unionized public employee, arguably violates the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 134
V.

THE TITLE IX AND UNIVERSITY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
CROSSROADS

Ostensibly, there might not appear to be a close or apparent
relationship between Title IX and public institution collective bargaining
agreements.1 3 5 To be sure, Title IX involves in large part students'
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209, 1221 (2015).
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1209, 1221.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.

131. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 0702, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES, (Jan. 18, 2007).

§ 553 (2012).

132.

See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

133.

See Dear Colleague Letter, supranote 1, at 2-3.

134.

See id at 10.

135.

U.S. DEP'T. OF EDU., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
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gender equity and their safety from sexual harassment on a college
campus.136 Unionized public employees, on the other hand, employed
on a college campus who may become victims of sexual harassment by a
fellow employee or university student enjoys the expansive protections
of Title VII, 137 state laws, 13 8 college policy 1 39 and the provisions of their
respective collective bargaining agreements. 4 0
However, what is revealed between these two seemingly unrelated
members of a campus community is that unionized public employees
who may be accused by a student of sexual harassment, and are held to
the standard of "preponderance of evidence" under Title IX and the 2011
Dear Colleague Letter, despite the fact that the employee's collective
bargaining agreement may require the heightened "clear and convincing
evidence" standard in order to discipline or terminate the employee for
the alleged harassing conduct.1 4 1 The juxtaposition of the preponderance
of the evidence standard under the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and the
more rigorous clear and convincing evidence standard found in many, if
not most public institution collective bargaining agreements demonstrate
that this undiscovered legal tension between these two conflicting
evidentiary standards are on a constitutional due process collision course
possibly before the U.S. Supreme Court. 142

STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, TITLE IX, at 22 (Jan.

2001).
136.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(l)-(7) (2012); see

U.S. DEP'T. OF EDU., supra note 135, at 2-3.

137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2012).
138. See CAL. GEN. CODE § 3500 (West 2016) (promoting "full communication between
public employers and their employees").
139. Due Process Before Discharge or the Imposition of Serious Sanctions, THE UNC POLICY
MANUAL
§
603-1,

http://www.northcarolina.edu/apps/policy/index.php?pg-dl&type-section&id-4433
(last visited
Apr. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Due Process] (affording faculty members protection and due process
from "unjust and arbitrary application of disciplinary penalties.")
140. See CAL. GEN. CODE § 3500 (West 2016) (promoting "full communication between
public employers and their employees"); see also Due Process, supra note 139, § 603-1 (affording
faculty members protection and due process from "unjust and arbitrary application of disciplinary
penalties."); see also Aidan Quigley & Natalie Shanklin, A Look at Unions on College Campuses:

Locally and Nationwide, THE ITHACAN (Mar. 5, 2015), https://theithacan.org/news/a-look-atunions-on-college-campuses-locally-and-nationwide/ (claiming that unions increase the job security

of faculty members by requiring employers to "show 'just cause' for firing employees in a union.").
141.

Matt Butler, Standard of Proof in Sexual Assault Cases Debated by Professors, THE

REVIEW (Nov. 10, 2014), http://udreview.com/standard-of-proof-in-sexual-assault-cases-debatedby-professors/.
142. Id.
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THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES

Until the 1960s, there was no federal legislation allowing public
employees "the right to organize and bargain collectively."1 4 3 However,
President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988144 in 1962,
granting federal employees the right to "greater participation in the
formulation and implementation of policies and procedures" of their
employment and to form or join any employee organization. 14 5
Executive Order 10988 came to be known "as the Magna Carta for
federal-employee unionism," because of the rights it granted to public
employees. 14 6 States adopted similar legislation to the Executive Order
in granting public employers "the authority to bargain with associations
of public employees."l 47 "By 1980, forty-two states had authorized
collective bargaining for at least some categories of public
employees."14 8
Just cause protection 149 is standard in labor agreements. 5 o While
143. Deborah Prokopf, Public Employees at the School ofHardKnox: How the Supreme Court
is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a History Lesson, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1363, 1365
(2013).
144. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 17, 1962).
145. Id.
146. Prokopf, supranote 143, at 1366.
147. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551; Prokopf, supranote 143, at 1366.
148. Prokopf, supranote 143, at 1366.
Labor organizers, particularly with the Service Employees International
Union's Adjunct Action initiative, have helped adjuncts and part-time
professors at other colleges and universities to unionize, including
Georgetown University, Tufts University and Northeastern University. The
SEIU is currently helping the part-time faculty at Ithaca College move toward
unionization. There are currently over 22,000 adjuncts and part-time faculty
members in unions with the SEIU, according to the organization's website.
According to the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in
Higher Education and the Professions at Hunter College in the City
University of New York, most schools where adjuncts vote to unionize, the
vote passes and the union is formed. Since January 2013, there have been 41
successful unionization votes for faculty and grad student unions while only
two unsuccessful votes and five petitions were withdrawn prior to votes.
Quigley & Shanklin, supra note 140.
149. See Straw v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n & Hospice, 86 A.3d 1016, 1021-22 (Vt. 2013) ("[W]e
first defined just cause as 'some substantial shortcoming detrimental to the employer's interests,

which the law and a sound public opinion recognize as a good cause for his dismissal.' . . . '[Tihe
ultimate criterion of just cause is whether the employer acted reasonably in discharging the

employee because of misconduct.' . . . [A] discharge under this standard could be upheld 'only if it
meets two criteria of reasonableness: one that it is reasonable to discharge employees because of

certain conduct, and the other, that the employee had fair notice, express or fairly implied, that such
conduct would be ground for discharge."').
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many if not most public labor agreements contain "just cause"
protections for its member-employees, more frequently, labor unions
have argued and negotiated greater protection for its employees in the
form of a heightened standard of review to meet in order to justify
discipline.' 5' The heightened standard is the "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard.1 52
VII.

THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD

"'Clear and convincing evidence' means evidence greater than a
preponderance of the evidence but not quite as high as the evidence
necessary for a criminal conviction."'5 3 To show clear and convincing
evidence, "a party's evidence should be unequivocal and uncontradicted,
and intrinsically probable and credible." 5 4 Whether in a Title IX sexual
assault investigation there can ever be credible evidence that is truly
"unequivocal and uncontradicted" in order to satisfy the clear and
convincing standard is a compelling subject for further research."'
Here, however, the thrust of the research focuses not on whether the
evidence gathered in a Title IX investigation satisfies the clear and
convincing standard, but whether which of the two standards at issue
(preponderance vs. clear and convincing) is constitutionally
permissible.1 5 6
At the heart of this question is fairness, reasonableness and the
ultimate wisdom of allowing a public labor agreement to heighten the
standard of review in a sexual assault investigation versus one of its
members. In doing so, the public employee would unfairly enjoy the
protection of a raised evidentiary standard which, for all intents and

150.

See

Seven

Tests

for

Just

Cause,

AFSCME

LOCAL

3336,

https://www.afscme3336.org:8383/Docs/stewardsGuides/SevenTestsForJustCause.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2017) [hereinafter AFSCME LOCAL 3336].
151. See Terminated or Laid Off the Job, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Civil-andWorkplace-Rights/Your-Rights-at-Work/Terminated-or-Laid-Off-the-Job
(last visited Apr. 8,
2017); see also AFSCME LOCAL 3336, supra, note 150.
152. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. v. 111. Educ. Labor Rels. Bd., 27 N.E.3d 623, 630 (111. App.
Ct. 2015); Bazydlo v. Volant, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ill. 1995).
153. Bd. ofTrs. ofthe Univ. ofIll., 27 N.E.3d at 630.
154. Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 511 N.W.2d 46, 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Kavanagh v.
The Golden Rule, 33 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Minn. 1948)).
155. Nancy Chi Cantalupo & John Villasenor, Is a Higher Standard Needed for Campus
Sexual Assault Cases?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2017/01/04/is-a-higher-standard-needed-for-campus-

sexual-assault-cases.
156.

See supra Part I.
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purposes, is almost impossible to meet. For if all sexual assault
investigations must meet the test of gathering evidence that is
"unequivocal and uncontradicted," then does the victim of sexual assault
suffer actual insult to injury? Arguably, utilizing the clear and
convincing standard would render a Title IX investigation as holding an
even higher evidentiary standard than there would be for the accused
public employee to be arrested for the same sexual assault criminally,
which requires only a probable cause determination. 15 7 This legal and
ethical conundrum has not seemed to alter the conscience or
endowments of some of the most prominent, influential and well-known
public universities in the U.S."'
VIII.

INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE

The University of California System, for example, a public higher
education system with over 238,000 students and 190,000 faculty and
staff members,15 9 boasts the most staunch institutional resistance to the
preponderance of the evidence standard. 160 Under the UC System, there
includes UC Berkeley, UCLA, UC Davis, and many other campuses
with thousands of students and employees. 16 1 Within this massive
educational system, whereupon a faculty member is accused of
misconduct of any nature, "[t]he hearing panel can only consider
157.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 215 (1983).
Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related context:
"[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less
than evidence which would justify condemnation .... It imports a seizure
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we said
that "the quanta . . .of proof" appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are
inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Finely tuned standards such as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision. While an
effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty
corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is clear that "only
the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the
standard of probable cause."

Id. at 235.
158. See
Bargaining
Units
&
Contracts,
UNIV.
OF
CAL.,
http://ucnet.universityofcalifomia.edullabor/bargaining-units (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
159. The UC System, UNIV. OF CAL., http://www.universityofcalifomia.edu/uc-system (last
visited Apr. 8, 2017).
160. See Bylaws of the Academic Senate tit. 3 (B)(7), UNIV. OF CAL.,
http://senate.universityofcalifomia.edu/bylaws-regulations/bylaws/blpart3.html#blpart3-II
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Bylaws].
161. The Parts of UC, UNIV. OF CAL., http://www.universityofcalifomia.edu/uc-system/partsof-uc (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
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evidence presented at the hearing and facts that are commonly known.
The administration has the burden of proving the allegations by clear
and convincing evidence."l 62
Within the University of North Carolina System, a public education
institution with over 220,000 students and sixteen university
campuses,163 upon a university faculty member being accused of
misconduct, the standard for discipline set forth dictates that:
In reaching decisions on which its written
recommendations to the chancellor shall be based, the
committee shall consider only the evidence presented at
the hearing and such written or oral arguments as the
committee, in its discretion, may allow. The university
has the burden of proof. In evaluating the evidence, the
committee shall use the standard of "clear and
convincing" evidence in determining whether the
institution has met its burden of showing that
permissible grounds for serious sanction exist and are
the basis for the recommended action. 64
The University of North Carolina System defines misconduct as
"violations of professional ethics, mistreatment of students or other
employees, research misconduct, financial fraud, criminal, or other
illegal, inappropriate or unethical conduct."16 5 There are two ways in
which such conduct would warrant serious disciplinary action. 16 6 First,
the misconduct is "sufficiently related to a faculty member's academic
responsibilities as to disqualify the individual from effective
performance of university duties."16 ' Alternatively, misconduct that is
"sufficiently serious as to adversely reflect on the individual's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to be a faculty member" would also warrant

162.

Privilege

and

Tenure,

U.C.

DAVIS,

http://academicsenate.ucdavis.edu/committees/committee-list/priv-and-tenure/pt-policies.html
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2017) ("Steps in a Disciplinary Case"); see also BYLAWS, supra note 160, for a
complete and comprehensive document review of all collective bargaining contracts within the
University of California system that these contracts, excluding faculty members, offer just cause
protection for its employees.
163.

About Our System, UNIV. OF N.C., https://www.northcarolina.edu/?q=content/about-our-

system (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
164. Due Process, supra note 139,
165. Id. § 603-1(c).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 603-1(c)(i).

§ 603-8

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss2/5
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serious disciplinary action.18
At The Ohio State University, a public education institution with
over 55,000 students, 16 9 when a faculty member is accused of
misconduct:
Upon receipt of a referral of a complaint from the dean,
the college investigation committee shall meet with the
complainant and the respondent and shall review any
documentary evidence provided by these parties. The
respondent shall be given copies of any documentary
evidence provided to the committee by the complainant.
The committee may also obtain relevant information
from other persons, but shall protect the confidentiality
At the conclusion of its
of the proceedings.
investigation, the committee shall deliver to the dean its
findings, a recommendation concerning the merits of the
complaint and, if the complaint is judged to have merit,
a proposed sanction. Findings of the committee shall be
based on clear and convincing evidence. 170
At Louisiana State University (LSU), the termination of a tenured
appointment, or the dismissal of a faculty member previous to the
expiration of a term appointment for cause, each must "be restricted to
(a) demonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research, (b)
substantial and manifest neglect of duty, and (c) personal conduct which
substantially impairs the individual's fulfillment of his institutional
responsibilities." 171
At LSU, both the faculty committee and the
governing board are required to consider any decision to terminate.12
Indeed, the school states that "[a]n important principle is that the burden
of proving the charges rests on the administration, based on clear and
convincing evidence of the faculty member's record as a whole."1 7 3

168. Id.
169.

§ 603-1(c)(ii).

Ohio State Life, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. COLL. OF MED.: GENETIC COUNSELING,

https://medicine.osu.edu/residents/masters_programs/genetic-counseling/columbus/ohio%20state%
201ife/pages/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
170.

BD. OF TR., THE OHIO STATE UNIV., RULES OF THE UNIV. FACULTY ch. 3335-5-04 (E)(2)

(emphasis added), http://trustees.osu.edu/rules/university-rules/chapter-3335-5-faculty-governanceand-committees.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
17 1. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, as an added component to the Title IX discussion, many
other public colleges and universities boast a clear and convincing policy for faculty misconduct.
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Similarly, at the University of Louisville and the Kentucky State
System, "[t]he burden of proof that there is adequate cause for dismissal
rests with the University and shall be satisfied only by clear and
convincing evidence in the record considered as a whole."l7 4
Interestingly, several well-known private universities, while not
subject to the strict due process constitutional requirements that public
institutions are subject to, have also resisted the "Dear Colleague"
preponderance of the evidence mandate. 175 Those same elite institutions,
however, are slowly capitulating to the will of the DOE.176 For example,
in November 2014, the DOE and Princeton University agreed to
terminate a civil rights investigation related to Princeton's management
of cases involving sexual assault on campus. 17 It was determined that
Princeton violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 for
"failing to promptly and equitably" answer complaints of sexual
violence. 17 8 Further, Princeton was using a higher standard of proof than
what was allowed by the DOE. 179 Notably, Princeton, a rare and
prominent institution, was the final Ivy League school to be using the
"clear and convincing" standard rather than the "preponderance of
evidence" standard when deciding assault cases. 80 And so, Princeton
lowered its standard to "preponderance of evidence" in compliance with
Title IX to satisfy the Department's OCR.1 8 1 Doing so brought an end to

See UNIv. COuNCIL, N. ILL. UNIV., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS art. 7.3.1.2 (emphasis added),
http://www.niu.edu/ucouncil/constitution/bylaws/articleO7.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2017) ("If it
is recommended that a tenured member of the faculty be dismissed for cause, or that a non-tenured
member of the faculty be dismissed before the expiration of the contract period, the burden of proof
that such action is justified shall be satisfied only by clear and convincing evidence in the record
considered as a whole."); see also N.D. UNIv. Sys., STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICIES § 605.48
(emphasis added), http://www.ndus.edu/makers/procedures/sbhe/default.asp?PID=56&SID=7
(last visited Mar. 20, 2017) ("The findings of fact, conclusions and the decision shall be based
solely on the evidence received by the Committee. In cases brought under section 605.3(4), the
faculty member has the burden of persuasion to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
action violated the faculty member's rights; in cases pursuant to section 605.3(8) or (9), the burden
of proof that grounds for the institution's action exist shall rest with the institution and be satisfied
only by clear and convincing evidence in the record considered as a whole.").
174. UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE, THE REDBOOK § 4.5.3 app. Termination Procedures (4)(E)
(emphasis added), http://louisville.edu/provost/redbook/chap4.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
175. Jake New, The Wrong Standard, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 6, 2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/11/06/princeton-title-ix-agreement-higher-standardproof-sexual-assault-cases-last-legs.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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the investigation.182
By the time the Department issued its Dear Colleague letter in
2011, roughly seventy percent of colleges were using the preponderance
of evidence standard. 183 The Dear Colleague letter did not merely
84
"recommend" that schools use this standard but instead, required it.1
However, the clear and convincing standard was still used at Ivy League
schools including, Yale University, Harvard, and Princeton.' Although
Yale altered its policies almost immediately following the release of the
186
In fact, both
Dear Colleague letter in 2011, Princeton and Yale did.
schools changed their respective policies only following an investigation
by the Department.187

The DOE can determine whether certain actions violate Title IX
and even pull federal funding from a college found in violation
therewith.' 88 However, the preponderance of evidence standard has not
been codified by Congress. 189 Indeed, the Campus SaVE Act is silent as
90 It merely requires
to what particular standard colleges must employ.'
1 91
that institutions disclose which standard they use.
While many colleges and universities are unfairly caught in the
middle between the publicly apparent but legally meritless DOE
mandate requiring the preponderance of the evidence standard, some
schools have taken the bold initiative to preemptively lower the standard
of proof in cooperation with university labor unions in order to avoid
1 92
For example, at
litigation and potential DOE Title IX investigations.
change in the
a
university,
a
public
the University of Delaware,
evidentiary standard of proof took place recently in January 2015.193 At
a special meeting of the University of Delaware Faculty Senate members
approved a resolution revising the Faculty Welfare and Privileges
Committee's Termination and Complaint Procedures to conform to new
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

Jerry Rhodes,

Special Meeting,

UDAILY

(Jan.

13,

2015,

4:20

LOUIS BOULGARIDES
http://www.udel.edu/udaily/2015/jan/FacultySenate011315.html;
12,
(Nov.
AGREEMENT
BARGAINING
COLLECTIVE
CFA/CSU

PM),

ET AL.,
2014),

http://www.calfac.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/cfa cba_2014-17_final 1.23.2015.pdf.
193. See Rhodes, supra note 192.
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requirements under the DOE's OCR interpretation of Title IX.194
Interestingly, the California State University System ("CSU") (as
directly opposed to the University of California System) in its present
labor agreement with the California Faculty Association holds that CSU
has the burden of proving alleged faculty misconduct by the
preponderance of the evidence in all discipline cases.' 9s
Notwithstanding the staunch public university resistance to the
Dear Colleague mandate, the crux of the reluctance to adopt such an
unfounded and constitutionally impaired legal policy rests primarily in
the critical due process considerations at play for the accused public
employee, the public labor union, the educational institution and, most
importantly, the alleged student-victim.
IX.

DUE PROCESS

Ultimately, the question remains: does the Title IX "preponderance
of the evidence" standard ostensibly mandatedby the U.S. DOE violate
the constitutional due process rights of the accused public employee?
The answer to this ominous question is made clear in the original text of
the U.S. Constitution and relevant legal precedent. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; Nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 96 In the past,
"this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions
of 'government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property."
The protection of individual liberty against arbitrary
government action is the touchstone of due process protection.198 The
Due Process Clause has both procedural and substantive components.1 99
In its procedural aspect, due process ensures that government, when
dealing with private persons, will use fair procedures. 2 00 In its
substantive aspect, due process safeguards individuals against certain
offensive government actions, notwithstanding that facially fair

194.

See id.

195.

BOULGARIDES ET AL., supra note 192, art. 19.29, at 78.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 118 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id.; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972).
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procedures are used to implement them. 2 0 1 There are two distinctive
202
safeguards offered under the doctrine of substantive due process.
First, the doctrine is said to be the source of protection for rights that are
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, but have been found to
be "central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 20 3
For example, the right to bodily integrity, marriage, and procreation are
interpreted as having their source in the doctrine of substantive due
process.204 Second, substantive due process is used to defend against
state action that is so unconstitutionally "arbitrary" or "consciousshocking," irrespective of the fairness of the procedures used to
205
implement those state actions.
To sustain a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff "must show
both that the [challenged] acts were so egregious as to shock the
conscience and that they deprived [her] of a protected interest in life,
liberty or property."206 There is firm legal foundation, however, in
support of the novel contention that, in regards to "academic decision"
making, the arbitrary and capricious standard is most appropriate when a
liberty or property interest is impinged,207 not the "shock the conscience
standard." 2 08
More specifically, at least one circuit court has held that "whether a
person has a substantive due process right to his public employment is
an unsettled question of law. . . ."209 Undoubtedly, most other circuits
"have rejected the claim that substantive due process protects the right to
a particular public employment position." 2 10 One circuit court, however,

201. DePoutot,424F.3dat115.
202. Yu Juan Sheng v. City of New York, No. CV-05-1118(RRM)(VVP), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129813, at *36-37 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009).
203. Id. at *37 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
206. Kraft v. Mayer, No. 10-CV-164-PB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8427, at *13 (D.N.H. 2012)
(alterations in original) (quoting Pagan v. Calderon, 488 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir. 2006)).
207. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985).
208. See id.; see also Carone v. Mascolo, 573 F. Supp. 2d 575, 594 (D. Conn. 2008) ("The
Supreme Court has enunciated two alternative tests by which substantive due process is examined.

Under the first theory, it is not required that the plaintiffs prove a violation of a specific liberty or
property interest; however, the state's conduct must be such that it 'shocks the conscience.' 'To
succeed under the second theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of an identified liberty or
property interest protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause." (alterations in original) (citations
omitted)).
209. Elliot v. Staton, No. 3:11-CV-1536-ST, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87449, at *5 (D. Or. Apr.
20, 2012) (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2007)).
210. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 996-97.
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make an arbitrary

and capricious decision significantly affecting a tenured teacher's
employment . status." 2 1 1 In Newman v. Massachusetts, a tenured
professor brought claims against university employees, alleging that they
violated her right to procedural due process in handling the plagiarism
charge, and her right to substantive due process by resolving the charge
against her on the merits.212 The court held, in finding for the fired
tenured faculty member that:
We are persuaded that at the time defendants acted it
was clearly established in our circuit that school
authorities who make an arbitrary and capricious
decision significantly affecting a tenured teacher's
employment status are liable for a substantive due
process violation. In reaching this conclusion, we
recognize that the courts are not yet unanimous on
whether this substantive right exists and that the
Supreme Court several times in the last decade has
sidestepped the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment provides substantive protection against
arbitrary and capricious academic decision-making....
In addition, we note that at the time of plaintiffs
censure, most circuits that had considered the issue
either had held explicitly or had suggested that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects public employees from
arbitrary and capricious government action affecting
their employment. Thus, even if in the future this circuit
or the Supreme Court rejects the view that a public
employee has a substantive due process right in these
circumstances, our recognition of that right was clear at
the time defendants acted and it is still viable law
today.213
The expansive and forward-looking decision in Newman (Newman
Standard), almost in anticipation of the Supreme Court establishing an
eventual harmonious standard, firmly establishes and plainly reveals an
uncharted Constitutional path to soundly support the argument that the

211. Newman v. Massachusetts, 884 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1989).
212. Id. at 21-22.
213. Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
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state-created right to tenured public employment is entitled to
substantive due process protection.2 14 In asserting this progressive and
somewhat novel constitutional concept, the court additionally held that
"plaintiffs substantive due process right was clearly established means
that . . defendants should have known that they were violating the law
if their decision to censure plaintiff was unrelated to educational
concerns, taken for trivial reasons, or wholly unsupported by any basis
in fact." 215
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered, but did not decide, this
same question of substantive due process in academic decision making
in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing.216 In this case,
respondent student filed an action against petitioner university. 2 17 The
Sixth Circuit directed the university to allow the student to retake an
218
The court
exam, and, if he passed, to reinstate him in the program.
the
review,
narrow
this
under
and
narrow,
very
was
its
review
held that
the
from
student
university did not act arbitrarily in dropping the
particular academic program because its decision was not such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the university's faculty did not exercise professional judgment. 2 19 In
its reversal, the Supreme Court held that:
In Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. V Horowitz, . . . we
assumed, without deciding, that federal courts can
review an academic decision of a public educational
institution under a substantive due process standard. In
this case Ewing contends that such review is appropriate
because he had a constitutionally protected property
interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex
But remembering Justice Brandeis'
program.
admonition not to "'formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied,"' we again conclude, as we did
in Horowitz, that the precise facts disclosed by the
record afford the most appropriate basis for decision.
We therefore accept the University's invitation to
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id. at 26.
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 227.
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"assume the existence of a constitutionally protectible
property right in [Ewing's] continued enrollment," and
hold that even if Ewing's assumed property interest
gave rise to a substantive right under the Due Process
Clause to continued enrollment free from arbitrary state
action, the facts of record disclose no such action.220
The Newman Standard, in context of the Supreme Court's Ewing
decision and the DOE's mandate in 2011, despite its being held out to
the general public as binding law, makes clear that the action of
unilaterally lowering an evidentiary standard, is "arbitrary and
capricious."2 21 The arbitrary executive action (i.e., academic decision
making) is not only in the Dear Colleague Letter's mandate to lower the
evidentiary standard of proof without review or comment in violation of
the APA,222 but also the DOE mandate violates the APA in a manner
that simultaneously violates state created collective bargaining rights, a
public university's duty to bargain with labor unions and, as a result,
220. Id. at 222-23 (alteration in original); see Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 962 (1st Cir.
1991) (citations omitted) ("The Supreme Court has twice said that it would assume that an
individual, in respect to 'property,' has a Constitutional ('due process') right to be 'free from
arbitrary state action.' But it has not explicitly held that such a right exists, nor has it described its
contours. (Would it mean, for example, that federal courts should review a large class of state
administrative actions as if they were federal actions being reviewed for compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that administrative decisions not be arbitrary?").);
Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Indeed, in the academic setting, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Ewing, courts may override a decision under substantive due process
only if that decision is 'such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment."'); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., No. 12-00137 HG-BMK, 2013 WL 1767710, at *11
(D.Haw. Aug. 23, 2013) ("To establish a violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff must prove
that the government's action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."); Mucci v. Rutgers, No. 08-4806(RBK),
2011 VL 831967, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2011) (citations omitted) ("With the exception of certain
fundamental rights, which are not implicated here, a state improperly deprives a person of a
substantive due process right if it acts arbitrarily and capriciously. To establish that an action or
policy is arbitrary and capricious, a plaintiff must prove that the state did not have a rational basis
for its conduct or that it was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to a legitimate government
objective."); Mawle v. Texas A & M Univ. Kingsville, No. CC-08-64, 2010 WL 1782214, at *8
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010) (citations omitted) ("To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff
must show that the government's deprivation of a property interest was arbitrary or not reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental interest. In Regents of University ofMichigan v. Ewing ... the

Supreme Court recognized that decisions in the academic setting are subject to 'a narrow avenue for
judicial review' under a substantive due process standard.").
221. Newman v. Mass., 884 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1989). The "Newman Standard," in
establishing a state-created right to tenured employment which enjoys substantive due process
protection, arguably gives rise to claims actionable under section 1983. See id
222. See supranotes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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directly impinges the terms and conditions of employment of unionized
public employees in violation of multiple public employment statutes. 223
In California for example, under Cal. Gov. Code section 3500
("MMBA"), the public employment statute articulates that "[i]t is the
purpose of this chapter to promote full communication between public
employers and their employees by providing a reasonable method of
resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment between public employers and public
When an employee or employee
employee organizations."2 24
representative complains that a local government employer has refused
to meet and confer over a mandatory subject of bargaining, the state
authorized Public Employment Relations Board processes the complaint
as an unfair labor practice charge.225
The MMBA's scope of representation covers any and all issues
regarding "employment conditions and employer-employee relations,
including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, except, however, that the scope of
representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or
organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive
order." 226

To resolve ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in the MMBA's
definition of the scope of representation, like most other jurisdictions,
courts look to federal precedents.22 7 To that end, with regard to
mandatory subjects of bargaining:
In relation to mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the federal NLRA, the United States Supreme Court has
identified three categories of management decisions. In
the first category are decisions that "have only an
indirect and attenuated impact on the employment
relationship" and thus are not mandatory subjects, of
bargaining. Examples of decisions in this category are
"choice of advertising and promotion, product type and
design, and financing arrangements." In the second
category are decisions directly defining the employment
223. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
224. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (West 2017) (emphasis added).
225. Id. § 3509.
226. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 188 v. Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., 245 P.3d 845, 852
(Cal. 2011) (emphasis added).
227. See id.
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relationship, such as wages, workplace rules, and the
order of succession of layoffs and recalls. Decisions in
this second category are always mandatory subjects of
bargaining. In the third category are management
decisions that directly affect employment, such as
eliminating jobs, but nonetheless may not be mandatory
subjects of bargaining because they involve "a change in
the scope and direction of the enterprise" or, in other
words, the employer's "retained freedom to manage its
affairs unrelated to employment." Bargaining is not
required for decisions in this category if they do not
raise an issue that is "amenable to resolution through the
bargaining process" although the employer is normally
required to bargain about the results or effects of such
decisions. To determine whether a particular decision in
this third category is within the scope of representation,
the high court prescribed a balancing test, under which
"in view of an employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions
that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if
the benefit, for labor-management relations and the
collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business."228
The California example is illustrative and also applicable
nationwide.2 29 Many public employment statutes mirror each other in
respect to management rights, discipline, rights of representation, etc.230
In the context of the Dear Colleague Letter, as the letter impinges upon
the terms and conditions of employment, public employers have a duty
to bargain with public labor unions over the evidentiary standard of
review in Title IX sexual assault investigations, as a term and condition
228.
229.

Id. at 852-53.
See CAL. Gov. CODE § 3504 (1968).

230.

See Michael D. Sutton, Forging a New Breed: The Emergence of Veterans' Preference

Statutes within the Private Sector, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1081, 1093-94 (2014) (explaining that privatesector

statutes mirror public employment statutes within

various

aspects

of employment

relationships); see also Reuel E. Schiller, Regulating the Workplace: Three Models of Labor and
Employment Law in the UnitedStates, U.C. HASTINGS SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY, at 1, 5, 8 (2012),

http://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2254&context-faculty scholarship
(explaining that federal regulations cause states to have similar statutes and citing various similar
state statutes).
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of employment, as legal precedent demonstrates, is a mandatory subject
of bargaining.23 1 In this light, it becomes plainly clear that public
education institutions who unilaterally adopt and publish employment
policies involving Title IX investigations evidentiary standards that
directly affect the terms and conditions of employment of unionized
public employees without bargaining those changes violates the
affirmative duty to bargain. 232
Stated in more direct terms, coupled with the above APA
contention, this note demonstrates that the strongest argument to directly
challenge the constitutionality of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter's
evidentiary mandate rests in the substantive due process rights of
unionized public employees whose property interest in employment has
been impinged by the act of an executive administration unilaterally
lowering the evidentiary standard of proof (academic decision making)
from "clear and convincing" to the lower "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. This lowered standard of proof directly impinges
the terms and conditions of employment when the educational institution
fails to negotiate this mandatory subject of bargaining. Unilaterally
lowering the evidentiary standard in a Title IX investigation of a
unionized public employee to "preponderance of the evidence" when the
stated terms of a collective bargaining agreement dictates a "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard plainly violates a collective bargaining
agreement, violates state public employment statutes, contravenes the
strict obligations of the APA, and ultimately, the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.
X.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the evidence presented above, there remains specific
steps that may be adopted by public universities and/or public labor
unions in order to mitigate the risk of litigation and resolve this looming
constitutional conflict while at the same time ensuring that victims of
sexual assault on campus receive the utmost in protection from
harassment. To be sure, without addressing this concern, the risk of
litigation is significant on both sides of the equation. For public labor
unions, the duty of fair representation presents the greatest risk of
litigation in this regard. Failing to legally challenge the unilateral action
of a public employer when that action (lowering the evidentiary standard

231.

See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 1.

232. See id.
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of proof) directly impinges on the terms and conditions of employment
of union members presents a daunting legal and ethical conflict for labor
unions and its respective members. Labor organizations that act as the
sole representative for members of a bargaining unit have the duty of fair
representation imposed upon them.233 The obligation to fairly represent
employees is considered to be of a doctrine of judicial origin that arose
out of the exclusive representation provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA").2 34 Simply, unions are required to fairly
represent the interests of all bargaining unit employees, both collectively
and individually. 235 A union breached the duty of fair representation,
"only when the union's conduct is 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith."' 2 36 As one court stated, "[a] union's conduct is arbitrary if,
considering all the circumstances at the time of the union's action or
inaction, 'the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of
reasonableness as to be irrational."' 2 37 The Supreme Court has found
that one example of a breach of the duty of fair representation is when a
union "arbitrarily ignore[s] a meritorious grievance or process[es] it in
[a] perfunctory fashion."2 38
The Eighth Circuit has defined
"perfunctory" to mean that the union "acted without concern or
solicitude, or gave plaintiff s grievance only cursory attention." 23 9
Equally so, for public colleges and universities (and potentially
individual members of the university administration under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983),240 the risk of litigation also remains high. Plaintiffs will
233. Brown v. Int'l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 512 F.
Supp. 1337, 1354 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 96 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)).
237. Natoli v. Dist. Lodge No. 837, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Aero. Workers, AFL-CIO, No.
4:14CV2017JCH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28086, at *5-6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 9,2015).
238. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (alterations in original)
(quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 191).
239. Brown v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 1354, 1357 (8th Cir. 1984).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); see also Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246,
256 (2009) ("A comparison of the substantive rights and protections guaranteed under Title IX and
under the Equal Protection Clause lends further support to the conclusion that Congress did not
intend Title IX to preclude [section] 1983 constitutional suits. Title IX's protections are narrower in
some respects and broader in others. Because the protections guaranteed by the two sources of law
diverge in this way, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that 'Congress saw Title IX as the

sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetrated
by educational institutions."'); Jones v. Lowndes County, 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Holding that to make out a section 1983 claim against a public official in their individual capacity,
a plaintiff must show "that the defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that
his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation."); Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d
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likely enjoy legal claims, inter alia, against a public university based on
breach of contract, potential Public Employment Relations Board
("PERB") violations, unfair labor practice charges (failure of the duty to
bargain), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
violations of various state statutory and constitutional protections in
addition to the above noted substantive due process argument. The
substantive due process claim is likely only applicable to the public
university, as the deprivation of the property interest required to sustain
the substantive due process claim by a state actor would be based upon
any adverse employment action taken by the university against the
accused public employee as a result of the Title IX investigation. The
DOE may also find itself in litigation, as the strongest claim that it may
face is the violation of the APA. Notwithstanding the above claims,
recommendations to resolve this constitutional conflict reflect the
complexity of this matter. There is no clear legal or political resolution
to this matter without some concession from all sides. Nonetheless, the
most reasonable, precedent-based and practical resolutions are
articulated below:
The DOE should amend its 2011 Dear Colleague letter to state that
the "preponderance of the evidence standard" is highly recommended or
strongly recommended in order to remain in compliance with Title IX.
The current language stating that colleges "must" decide sexual assault
investigations with the preponderance of the evidence standard is in
violation of the APA and unfairly subjects public universities to
substantive due process litigation, breach of contract and claims of
failure of the duty to bargain a mandatory subject of bargaining (the
standard of proof in Title IX sexual assault investigation are terms and
conditions of employment).
The DOE, alternatively, should affirm the substance of the 2011
Dear Colleague Letter but simply submit the already published
interpretive rule in its totality for review and comment in accordance
with the APA. By submitting the Dear Colleague Letter to the Federal
Register, the DOE would enjoy the benefits of the letter's mandate while
at the same time codifying its requirements as binding agency policy.
This approach, if adopted and post review and comment, would provide
the necessary legal foundation for public universities to unilaterally and
386, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[A] supervisory official may be held liable [under section 1983] ... only
if (1) [they] affirmatively participate[] in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2)
[they] implement[] unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.");
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[L]iability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior is not cognizable in [section] 1983 actions.").
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universally adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard without
having to collectively bargain the rule, and thus, evading the everpresent substantive due process, unfair labor practice, and failure to
bargain a mandatory subject claims.
Public universities and labor unions should jointly bargain and
adopt an agreed upon standard of proof in a Title IX sexual assault
investigation. In doing so, (along with the suggestive remaining
procedural guidelines from the DOE's Dear Colleague Letter, the Clery
Act 2 4 1 and the Campus SaVE Act 242 ), the risk of litigation is greatly

reduced as both parties would create the opportunity to shape fairly the
disciplinary landscape of its labor workforce without the need for
unilateral action by the college administration or claims by the union of
241. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(18); The Clery Act in Detail, KNow YOUR IX,
http://knowyourix.org/the-clery-act-in-detail (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
242. Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act, H.R. 2016, 112th Cong. (2011-2012),
https://www.congress.gov/billl 12th-congress/house-bill/2016.

Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act or Campus SaVE Act - Amends
title IV (Student Assistance) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require
each institution of higher education (IE) participating in a title IV program
to include in its annual security report on campus security policy and crime
statistics a statement of current policies for reporting crimes or other

emergencies in or on noncampus buildings or property (currently, only
reporting of crimes on campus is required). Requires such report to include
statistics concerning the occurrence of domestic violence, dating violence,

and stalking incidents reported to campus security authorities or local police.
Requires schools to protect victim confidentiality when reporting criminal
threats to the campus community. Directs IHEs to include in their annual

security report a statement of policy regarding their programs to prevent
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking and the
procedures they follow when such an offense is reported. Requires such

procedures to include: (1) the provision, in writing, to students or employees
that report that they have been the victim of such an offense certain
information regarding their rights, disciplinary processes, victim services, and
safety planning; (2) a description of how the IHE will help enforce any
protective order; and (3) information about how the IHE will protect victim
confidentiality. Requires an IHE's policy regarding such offenses to include:
(1) education that promotes awareness of the offenses; (2) possible sanctions

or protective measures imposed following disciplinary action; (3) procedures
victims should follow after such an offense occurs; (4) information about to
whom the alleged offense should be reported; (5) institutional disciplinary

procedures; and (6) the notification of victims regarding their options for, and
assistance in, changing academic, living, transportation, and working
situations.

Directs the Secretary of Education to seek the counsel of the

Attorney General and Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regarding the development, and dissemination to IHEs, of best practices for
preventing and responding to incidents of domestic violence, dating violence,
sexual assault, and stalking.

Id.
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the failure to bargain a mandatory subject.
State legislatures should codify by statute the standard of proof in
on-campus sexual assault investigations so that the standard (1) mirrors
the substance of the Dear Colleague Letter (preponderance), and (2)
mirrors the standard of proof of the criminal equivalent to a sexual
assault charge (probable cause) in order to make more consistent the
definition of rape, sexual assault, etc. In doing so, state public
institutions and labor unions would be compelled to adopt the standard
and would thwart any potential litigation arguing the validity of the
preponderance of the evidence standard. There are no Supremacy
Clause issues at play to invalidate the proposed state legislation on the
standard of proof since the Dear Colleague Letter is not binding agency
policy. 2 43 Several states have made considerable progress in addressing
this concern in light of the Dear Colleague Letter's questionable legal
footing. The State of California, for example, has taken the bold step to
codify by statute another contested area of concern in the Title IX Dear
Colleague Letter debate. 24 On September 28, 2014, California became
the first state in the nation to establish a statutory definition of "consent"
in on-campus sexual assault investigations.24 5 The State of Arizona has
proposed similar legislation. 246 Not surprisingly, California's "Yes
Means Yes" law (affirmative consent), similar to the 2011 Dear
Colleague Letter, fails to take into account that the accused party in a
Title IX sex assault investigation may in fact be a unionized public

243. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 404 (1946) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012)).
244. See S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
245. See id ("An affirmative consent standard in the determination of whether consent was
given by both parties to sexual activity.

'Affirmative consent' means affirmative, conscious, and

voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in
the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to
engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence
mean consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be
revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the

fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of
consent."); see also Bill Chappell, California Enacts 'Yes Means Yes' Law, Defining Sexual

Consent, NPR
(Sept.
29,
2014,
12:27
PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/09/29/352482932/califomia-enacts-yes-means-yes-law-defining-sexual-consent; Richard
Perez-Pena & Ian Lovett, California Law on Sexual Consent Pleases Many but Leaves Some
Doubters, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/us/califomia-law-onsex-consent-pleases-many-but-leaves-some-doubters.html?_r=0.
246. Matthew Hendley, "Yes Means Yes" Law Proposed By Some Arizona Lawmakers,
PHOENIX
NEW
TIIMES
(Jan.
21,
2015),

http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/2015/01 /yes means_yeslaw_proposed-bysome ar
izonalawmakers.php.
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employee with a collective bargaining agreement that requires a
collectively bargained evidentiary standard.
Alternatively, public education labor unions that have endured
unilateral university action regarding the standard of proof in Title IX
sexual assault investigations should seek declaratory relief as to whether
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter's evidentiary mandate is in fact binding
law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201, The Declaratory Judgment
Act.247 In 2005, the Supreme Court, in defining and explaining the
contours of this law indicated that:
The Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to
confer on federal courts unique and substantial
discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of
litigants. On its face, the statute provides that a court
"may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration." The statute's
textual commitment to discretion, and the breadth of
leeway we have always understood it to suggest,
distinguish the declaratory judgment context from other
areas of the law in which concepts of discretion surface.
We have repeatedly characterized the Declaratory
Judgment Act as "an enabling Act, which confers a
discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right
upon the litigant."2 4 8
XI.

CONCLUSION

Title IX is valuable public policy for which its purpose and intent is
laudable and necessary to protect against sexual harassment on campus.
Notwithstanding this Article's legal contentions, the protection of
victims of sexual assault must remain the paramount concern in this
conversation. While these laws should be advanced and reauthorized, it
is also important to remain vigilant as to the procedures with which we

247. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010); see Verizon New Eng., Inc. v. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 651
F.3d 176, 188 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Requests for a declaratory judgment may not be granted unless they
arise in a context of a controversy 'ripe' for judicial resolution. Ripeness is an Article III
jurisdictional requirement. The need for ripeness is emphasized in the Declaratory Judgment Act
(DJA), which refers to an 'actual' controversy. This is a sine qua non of any assumption of federal
jurisdiction.").

248. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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implement amendments, guidance documents and agency rules based
upon those laws. Accordingly, the DOE's 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
implements mandatory policy that fails to adhere to established
requirements under the APA as set forth by Congress. As such, this
conflict must be remedied with all due expediency for the sake of clarity,
prudence and fairness.
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